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Abstract—Achieving ultra-reliable, low-latency and secure
communications is essential for realizing the industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT). Non-coherent massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) is one of promising techniques to fulfill ultra-
reliable and low-latency requirements. In addition, physical
layer authentication (PLA) technology is particularly suitable for
secure IIoT communications thanks to its low-latency attribute.
A PLA method for non-coherent massive single-input multiple-
output (SIMO) IIoT communication systems is proposed in this
paper. This method realizes PLA by embedding an authentication
signal (tag) into a message signal, referred to as ”message-
based tag embedding”. It is different from traditional PLA
methods utilizing uniform power tags. We design the optimal
tag embedding and optimize the power allocation between the
message and tag signals to characterize the trade-off between
the message and tag error performance. Numerical results show
that the proposed message-based tag embedding PLA method
is more accurate than the traditional uniform tag embedding
method which has an unavoidable tag error floor close to 10%.
Index Terms—Massive SIMO, non-coherent communication,
physical layer authentication, industrial Internet of Things.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has recentlyattracted tremendous attention from researchers and en-
gineers owing to its ability to improve the efficiency and pro-
ductivity of various industries. The IIoT combines machine-
to-machine communications with automation technologies to
precisely control the production process for achieving sus-
tainable and efficient manufacturing [1]. Compared with the
traditional industrial networks mainly based on wired cables,
wireless communications are more suitable for the IIoT due to
low maintenance expenditure, flexible deployment and long-
term reliability [2]. However, ultra-reliable, low-latency and
secure requirements of the IIoT represent main challenges for
wireless design [3], [4]. Wireless channels suffer from path-
loss, shadowing, fading and interference, thus it is challeng-
ing to design wireless networks to achieve the ultra-reliable
transmission [5]. Moreover, the broadcast characteristic of
wireless channels makes the IIoT systems more vulnerable
to attacks [6]. Non-coherent massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) has recently been regarded as a promising
technology to meet ultra-reliable and low-latency requirements
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of IIoT communications [7], which uses multiple receive an-
tennas to reduce the effects of fading and uncorrelated noise in
wireless channels and to boost the system reliability. Besides,
non-coherent massive MIMO uses energy-based modulation
to achieve low latency by avoiding channel estimation and by
applying fast non-coherent detection [8], [9].
Two security services commonly considered in the IIoT,
including integrity and authenticity, are essential in IIoT
systems. Message authentication code (MAC) is a prevalent
mechanism to provide these two services. Conventional sys-
tems realize message authentication by attaching a MAC to the
message and this authentication process is executed above the
physical layer [10], e.g., by the transport layer security (TLS)
protocol in the transport layer and by the Wi-Fi protected
access II (WPA2) protocol in the network layer. However,
these conventional mechanisms may not be able to meet the
stringent low-latency requirement of IIoT communications.
Because short-packet transmission is one of the characteristics
of the IIoT, the transmission overhead for the MAC can be
large and excessive in the short packet transmission with
small payload [2], leading to relatively large delays. Two
approaches were used to deal with this issue, one is lightweight
security [11] and the other is physical layer security [6].
Lightweight security mechanisms aim to save processing time
by designing a cipher or protocol that only needs a small
amount of computation. But the transmission overhead for
security related data, e.g., MAC, still exists and increases the
communication latency. On the other hand, addressing security
issues from the physical layer incurs little or no transmission
overhead and it represents a promising alternative in low
latency communication scenarios.
Physical layer security, according to its implementation
method, can be further divided into two categories. The first
category is based on information-theoretic approach, which
was proposed by Shannon [12] and further developed by
Wyner using the wiretap channel model [13]. This kind of
approach only guarantees data confidentiality by preventing
eavesdropper from understanding the information, but other
security services like data integrity and authenticity are not
considered in these methods. In other words, they were de-
signed to address passive attacks (e.g., eavesdropping) rather
than active attacks (modification, masquerade or replay attack).
Besides, the information-theoretic security might be unfeasible
in the practical scenarios, because the channel advantages
assumption does not always hold in practice [14]. The second
category is based on the signal and channel features, which
aims to provide authenticity and data integrity. In IIoT scenar-
ios, active attacks are much more harmful than passive attacks
[15]. Authentication is an effective mechanism to deal with ac-
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2tive attacks, therefore, we focus on using the second category
methods to realize physical layer authentication (PLA) in IIoT
communication systems.
Generally, authentication has two kinds of meanings. One
is identity authentication, which only cares if the message
comes from a legitimate user. The other meaning is message
authentication, which assures that the received data has not
been altered by an unauthorized method and a given entity
is the original source of the received data. In IIoT com-
munication systems, data integrity and authenticity are both
needed. Therefore, the authentication we intend to realize
is the combination of identity authentication and message
authentication.
Existing PLA methods have two forms: passive and active
[16]. Passive PLA utilizes the intrinsic features of communica-
tion systems to authenticate the transmitter, such as radio sig-
nal strength indicator, channel state information (CSI) and ra-
dio frequency fingerprints [6]. These features were thoroughly
analyzed in [17] with a theoretical model and experimental val-
idation. It is shown that the intrinsic features are not reliable in
practical scenarios due to the device mobility, wireless fading
channels and indistinguishable RF fingerprints. Furthermore,
passive PLA only completes identity authentication but not
message authentication, because it cannot detect if the received
data have transmission error or have been modified by a
malicious user. In contrast, active PLA refers to the methods in
which the transmitter sends additional information (normally
referred to as tag) for authentication at the physical layer [18].
Active PLA embeds a tag into the message information and
does not take extra time to transmit the tag. Thanks to its
potential to meet low-latency requirements, active PLA has
advantages over conventional authentication methods sending
message information and authentication information separately
[19].
In addition to the advantage of low latency, the embedding
method of active PLA has another important benefit: it in-
creases the attacker’s uncertainty about the tag information
because the tag is “hidden” in the message [20]. An attacker
who intends to invade into the IIoT system needs to acquire
a valid secret key of the system. If the received message and
tag pair cannot be completely distinguished by the attacker,
then the secret key may not be obtained correctly even if
the brute force analysis is used. The attacker’s uncertainty
about the tag improves the security of the IIoT system further.
Admittedly, this kind of uncertainty also exists for the legit-
imate receiver. However, the goal of the legitimate receiver
is different from that of the attacker, and the impacts of the
uncertainty to them are different. Specifically, the legitimate
receiver needs to decide whether the received message is
authenticated successfully (one bit information) while the
attacker tries to acquire the whole correct tag (tag-length bits
information). In this context, the impacts of the tag uncertainty
can be quite minor to the legitimate receiver but a challenging
task to the attacker. Overall, the tag embedding design can
reduce the transmission overhead and latency, but at the same
time, it causes a trade-off between communication security
and reliability. Through an appropriate tag embedding design,
active PLA methods can secure the system while fulfilling
its other communication requirements. It is worth noting that
active PLA requires “freshness mechanisms” [21], e.g., time
stamps or sequence numbers, to resist replay attacks thereby
realizing identity and message authentication. The freshness
mechanisms can be easily adopted in a time-synchronized IIoT
system with few overheads. Note that time stamps or sequence
numbers can also be embedded into message information.
In this context, almost no extra transmission time for the
”freshness” is needed. The freshness mechanism part is not
within the scope of this paper, and we mainly focus on the
realization of active PLA.
The key issue of implementing active PLA is how to embed
a tag into message information at the physical layer. Several
methods dealing with this issue have been published. The
tag was added as noise in [22]: different additional angle
offsets to normal quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) indi-
cate different tag bits. 4/16 hierarchical quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM) was applied in [23] to transmit message
and tag simultaneously, where a 4-QAM tag constellation is
superimposed on a 4-QAM message constellation. Challenge-
response PLA was introduced in [24] and the authentication
information was embedded during “challenge-and-response”
process. Although these active PLA methods transmit a tag
and a message at the same time, they all need to send separate
pilots for channel estimation to acquire the instantaneous CSI.
In [25], a tag is embedded into the original pilot to form a
new pilot, and the tag detection is completed by a correlation
operation. Then the new pilot signal is used to estimate CSI for
message recovery. Note that these existing active PLA methods
are no longer suitable for non-coherent massive MIMO-based
IIoT systems, because no estimation of the instantaneous CSI
is performed in the non-coherent communication system. To
our best knowledge, how to perform active PLA for non-
coherent systems remains an open problem.
As the first attempt to fill this gap, in this paper we focus on
designing an active PLA mechanism for non-coherent massive
single-input multiple-output (SIMO) IIoT systems. Specifi-
cally, we consider an IIoT system where sensors with a single
antenna transmit information to a controller with multiple
antennas. As elaborated in [26], non-negative pulse amplitude
modulation (PAM) is a favorable scheme for the considered
system. Based on this modulation scheme, we utilize the
uniform embedding first as traditional active PLA methods do.
The error performance prevents the use of the uniform embed-
ding design. The reason is that the variance of the received
signal will increase as the amplitude of the transmitted signal
increases [27]. In this context, the tag embedding design does
not have to be uniform as in the existing work, but needs to
be optimized according to the message constellation, which
is referred to as message-based tag embedding in this paper.
The tag embedding design becomes a nontrivial problem as
the increased tag signal power reduces the error probability of
the tag while increasing the error probability of the message,
leading to the error performance trade-off between the message
and the tag. In addition, multiple optimization variables and
complex constraints make this design more challenging. In
this paper, we manage to find the asymptotic optimal tag
embedding design based on given system requirements. Then
3we characterize the trade-off between message and tag error
performance through setting different system requirements,
which can provide useful insights for practical system design.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• For the considered IIoT system and the modulation
scheme, when the conventional uniform embedding
scheme is used, a close-form message symbol error rate
(SER) and tag SER are derived and the error floor is
shown to illustrate the shortcomings and limitations of
this embedding design.
• A new message-based embedding scheme is proposed to
realize PLA for the considered system. An asymptotic op-
timal embedding design is given by solving a formulated
optimization problem. The resulting design minimizes the
tag SER while fulfilling the system requirements (i.e.,
power constraint, message accuracy).
• When the system average power is fixed, the trade-off be-
tween message and tag error performance is demonstrated
through setting different message accuracy requirements.
The performance improvement of the tag SER will cause
the performance of the message SER to decrease. How-
ever, numerical results show that the tag and message
SER can be maintained at a quite low level (e.g., less
than 10−6) when the system power and the number of
receiving antennas are properly configured.
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows. Section
II presents the system model of the proposed PLA method for
non-coherent massive SIMO communications. The preliminar-
ies of the communication system are introduced in Section
III. The error performance of the uniform embedding and
message-based embedding is analyzed in Section IV. Through
the error performance analysis, the optimal tag embedding
design problem is solved in Section V. The numerical results
are provided in Section VI. Finally, Section VII summarizes
this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider the PLA in a massive SIMO-based
IIoT communication system, where a sensor with one single
antenna transmits data to a controller with N antennas1. An
attacker is within the range of this wireless communication
system, who can receive the signals from sensors and send
malicious signal to the controller.
To meet the low-latency requirement of the IIoT, we adopt
non-negative PAM at the transmitter and non-coherent maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) detector at the receiver [7]–[9]. Since
only statistics of the channel are needed in this method, the
channel estimation process is not required and the authenti-
cation can be executed faster. To realize PLA, the transmitter
embeds a tag signal into a message signal at the physical layer,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The l-bit binary MAC is denoted by
M , which is generated by a binary message sequence (denoted
1Note that in this system, multiple sensors can transmit data to the controller
with time-division multiple access (TDMA).
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the PLA at the transmitter side.
by b) and a secret key2 (denoted by k) with a hash function.
The MAC M is given by
M = hash(b, k). (1)
The modulated signals of message b and MAC M are denoted
by m and t, respectively. They are referred to as the message
signal and the tag signal, respectively. Since an energy-based
PAM is utilized in the system, the ⊕ sign in Fig. 1 represents
the sum of two signal powers. Therefore, the amplitude of the
transmitted signal x is then determined by
x =
√
|m|2 + |t|2, (2)
where m ∈M = {mi|i = 1, · · · , Lm} and t ∈ T = {ti,j |i =
1, · · · , Lm; j = 1, · · · , Lt}. Lm and Lt are the numbers
of message signal and tag signal constellation points, respec-
tively. The transmitted signal that involves message signal mi
is denoted as xi. The average power of message signal Em
and the average power of tag signal Et are constrained by the
total average power Etot
Em + Et ≤ Etot, (3)
where Em = 1Lm
Lm∑
i=1
|mi|2 and Et = 1LmLt
Lm∑
i=1
Lt∑
j=1
|ti,j |2.
Though a secret key is adopted to generate a MAC in the
proposed method, it is different from traditional authentication
mechanisms used at higher layers thanks to the tag embedding
operation at the physical layer.
When a sensor transmits an embedded signal x, the received
signal y at the controller in the considered massive SIMO
system can be represented by
y = hx+ n, (4)
where h = [h1, · · · , hN ]T is the SIMO channel vector and
n = [n1, · · · , nN ]T is the noise vector between the sensor
and controller. We assume that h is a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random vector. Specifically, each element of
h is independently and identically distributed with a zero mean
and unit variance (i.e., Rayleigh fading). Another assumption
is that n is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
vector which is independent of h. The mean vector of n is a
zero vector and its covariance matrix is σ2IN . σ2 is assumed
to be known and IN is an N -dimensional identity matrix.
Two steps are required in the signal detection at the receiver
side. First, following the ML detection rule for non-coherent
2Note that the overhead for generating and maintaining a secret key exists in
both traditional methods and physical layer methods (e.g., channel-based key
generation). We refer the readers to the detailed conventional key generation
schemes [19] for more information.
4detection, the estimated message signal mˆ is obtained at the
receiver by solving the problem
mˆ = arg max
m∈M
f(y|m), (5)
where f(y|m) is the probability density function (PDF) of
y conditioned on m. Second, the estimated tag signal tˆ is
obtained based on mˆ with the ML rule,
tˆ = arg max
t∈T
f(y|mˆ, t), (6)
where f(y|mˆ, t)) is the PDF of y conditioned on mˆ and t.
After the detection, we can get the estimated message
sequence b′ and the estimated MAC M ′ with the demodu-
lation of mˆ and tˆ, respectively. Then a new MAC Mn is
calculated with b′ and k by the same hash function, i.e.,
Mn = hash(b
′, k). The authentication process is completed
by comparing M ′ with Mn. The number of the same bits for
binary sequences M ′ and Mn is denoted by l′, then the tag
accuracy θ is defined as follows
θ =
l′
l
. (7)
We use hypothesis testing to achieve authentication due to
the introduced uncertainty by tag embedding. We have two
hypotheses:
H0 : y does not contain a valid tag,
H1 : y contains a valid tag.
(8)
Using θ as the test statistic, a threshold θ0 is calculated accord-
ing to the system requirements. Which hypothesis should be
chosen can be decided by comparing θ with θ0. If θ ≥ θ0, then
H1 is chosen, which represents the message can be regarded
as coming from a legitimate user and has not been tampered
with. Otherwise, this message will be discarded because it is
not authenticated successfully. As for how to determine the
threshold θ0, we adopt the Neyman-Pearson principle, which
maximizes the detection rate P (H1|H1) while the false alarm
rate P (H1|H0) is set to less than or equal to a constant .
Since the attacker has no knowledge of the secret key, he
can only randomly generate l−bit MAC and embed this MAC
into a message to spoof the controller. At the controller side,
each received MAC bit has a probability of 12 to be the same
with the MAC bit calculated by the binary symbol of the
received message and the secret key. Then the false alarm
rate P (H1|H0) can be represented by
P (H1|H0)=
l∑
i=dlθ0e
(
l
i
)(
1
2
)i(
1
2
)l−i
=
l∑
i=dlθ0e
(
l
i
)(
1
2
)l
,
(9)
where dlθ0e is the ceiling integer of lθ0. The threshold θ0 can
be obtained by solving the inequality P (H1|H0) ≤  with the
following two steps. First, we find the largest integer from
0 to l, which can make the inequality true. This integer is
denoted by i∗. Second, we solve the equation lθ0 = i∗−1+ρ
to obtain the threshold θ0 = i
∗−1+ρ
l , where ρ is a positive
infinitesimal. After obtaining θ0, we can calculate the detection
rate P (H1|H1). When a legitimate sensor transmits its signal
to the controller, let p denote the bit error rate of the MAC,
then P (H1|H1) can be calculated by
P (H1|H1) =
l∑
i=dlθ0e
(
l
i
)
(1− p)i (p)l−i . (10)
When the hypothesis H1 is true, l′ is a random variable
following the binomial distribution with parameters l and
1 − p, i.e., l′ ∼ B(l, 1 − p). According to the properties of
a binomially distributed random variable, the expectation of l′
is E[l′] = l(1 − p). Then the expectation of the test statistic
can be calculated by E[θ] = E[l′]/l = 1− p. We can make a
correct decision if θ > θ0. Note that the expectation E[θ] is
a decreasing function of p. In other words, we can maximize
P (H1|H1) by minimizing p. In the next two sections, we will
elaborate how to design tag embedding method to minimize p,
so as to improve the security of the considered massive SIMO
system.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND DETECTION RULES
In this section, we first introduce preliminaries on non-
negative PAM design for message constellation in the massive
SIMO system, and then present the corresponding detection
rules when a tag symbol is embedded into a message symbol.
A. Preliminaries on Message Constellation Design
We now consider that only a message symbol m ∈ M is
transmitted. The problem (5) has been solved in [9], which
showed that the ML detection problem can be solved by
a quantization operation. More specifically, the quantization
operation is described as [9]
mˆ =

m1, if
||y||2
N < B1;
mi, if Bi−1 ≤ ||y||
2
N ≤ Bi, i = 2, · · · , Lm − 1;
mLm , if
||y||2
N > BLm−1,
(11)
where Bi is the optimal decision threshold3 between mi and
mi+1. The threshold Bi can be represented by
Bi =
AiAi+1 ln
Ai+1
Ai
Ai+1 −Ai , i = 1, ..., Lm − 1, (12)
where Ai = |mi|2 + σ2. Based on this optimal decision rule,
the correct detection probability of i-th symbol mi, denoted
by Pc,i, is determined by [9]
Pc,i =

G
(
NBi
Ai
)
, if i = 1;
G
(
NBi
Ai
)
−G
(
NBi−1
Ai
)
, if i = 2, · · · , Lm − 1;
1−G
(
NBLm−1
Ai
)
, if i = Lm,
(13)
where G(z) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
a complex Chi-squared distribution variable Z given by
G(z) = 1− e−z
N−1∑
L=0
zL
L!
, z > 0. (14)
3Uncoded binary sequences and hard decision are adopted in this work, an
error correcting code and soft decision will be considered in the future work.
5When each message symbol is selected from M with equal
probability, the average message SER, denoted by Pe, can be
calculated as follows:
Pe = 1− 1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pc,i. (15)
By minimizing Pe under the constraint that average message
power is not greater than Em, the asymptotically optimal non-
negative PAM constellation design for massive SIMO systems
can be represented as follows [9]:{
0, σ2(R− 1), σ2(R2 − 1), · · · , σ2(RLm−1 − 1)} , (16)
where R (R > 1) is obtained by solving the equation
Lm−1∑
j=0
Rj = Lm
(
Em
σ2
+ 1
)
. (17)
Note that the constellation design is asymptotically optimal,
which means that the constellation is strictly optimal only
when the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) grows to infinity. Ac-
cording to the findings in [9], this design has been shown
to be close to optimal when the transmitter transmits signals
with a relatively high power. In addition, when the SNR is
fixed, the optimal constellation design is the same as the
case with an infinite number of receiving antennas [9]. The
message SNR, denoted by γm, is defined as γm = Emσ2 .
Similarly, the total SNR, γtot, is defined as γtot = Etotσ2 .
The constellation points are described from the perspective
of power since there is a specific correspondence between
power and amplitude in non-negative PAM. Take Lm = 4
as an example, the message constellation points Ai and the
corresponding decision thresholds Bi are shown in Fig. 2.
𝐴1 𝐴2 𝐴3 𝐴4
𝐵1 𝐵2 𝐵3
Fig. 2. Message constellation design and the corresponding decision thresh-
olds.
B. Detection Rules
Based on the asymptotically optimal message constella-
tion design in Section III-A, we are now ready to elabo-
rate the corresponding detection rules when a tag symbol
is embedded into a message symbol. The transmitted signal
xi,j , generated by embedding ti,j into mi, is expressed as
xi,j =
√|mi|2 + |ti,j |2. Due to the effect of the embedding
tag signal, the message decision thresholds (12) need to be
updated. Since the constellation points that are close to each
other are more error-prone, we use the nearest two constella-
tion points to calculate new message decision threshold Bi,
Bi =
Ai,LtAi+1,1 ln
Ai+1,1
Ai,Lt
Ai+1,1 −Ai,Lt
, i = 1, ..., Lm − 1, (18)
where Ai,j = |mi|2 + |ti,j |2 + σ2. Using (11) and (18), the
message symbol can be estimated, which is the first step of the
detection. Based on the result of estimated message symbol
mi, tag symbol is detected subsequently with the following
rule,
tˆ =

ti,1, if
||y||2
N < Ci,1;
ti,j , if Ci,j−1 ≤ ||y||
2
N ≤ Ci,j , j = 2, · · · , Lt − 1;
ti,Lt , if
||y||2
N > Ci,Lt−1,
(19)
where Ci,j is the optimal decision threshold to decide which
tag symbol is embedded into message symbol mi. Since (12)
also follows the general form of non-coherent ML decision
threshold, Ci,j can be expressed as
Ci,j =
Ai,jAi,j+1 ln
Ai,j+1
Ai,j
Ai,j+1 −Ai,j ,
(i = 1, 2, · · · , Lm; j = 1, 2, · · · , Lt − 1).
(20)
Note that the instantaneous CSI is not required in message
detector (11) and tag detector (19). As such, successive inter-
ference cancellation (SIC) detection widely used in existing
PLA methods is no longer applicable in this method.
IV. ERROR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND TAG
EMBEDDING METHODS
In this section, the message SER and tag SER are analyzed
first as the performance metrics of the proposed PLA method.
Then two tag embedding methods are elaborated and analyzed
from the perspective of the error performance.
A. Error Performance Analysis
According to the assumptions of h and n in Section II, y is
also a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector.
The mean vector of y is a zero vector, and its covariance
matrix can be written as
E
[
yyH
]
= E
[(
h
√
|m|2 + |t|2 + n
)(
h
√
|m|2 + |t|2 + n
)H]
=
(|m|2 + |t|2 + σ2) IN .
(21)
Define a new random variable Z ′
Z ′ =
||y||2
|m|2 + |t|2 + σ2 , (22)
which follows complex Chi-squared distribution. When x1,1
(m1 with embedding tag t1,1) is transmitted, according to
(11) and (18), the message signal can be correctly detected
if ||y||
2
N < B1. This condition is equivalent to
||y||2
|m1|2 + |t1,1|2 + σ2 <
NB1
|m1|2 + |t1,1|2 + σ2 =
NB1
A1,1
. (23)
The correct message detection probability of x1,1 is equal
to G
(
NB1
A1,1
)
. Let Pcm,i denote the average correct message
detection probability of xi,j . Then Pcm,1 can be derived as
Pcm,1 =
1
Lt
Lt∑
j=1
G
(
NB1
A1,j
)
. (24)
Similarly, Pcm,i can be given from (11) by
6Pcm,i=

1
Lt
Lt∑
j=1
G
(
NBi
Ai,j
)
, if i=1;
1
Lt
Lt∑
j=1
[
G
(
NBi
Ai,j
)
−G
(
NBi−1
Ai,j
)]
, if i=2, · · · , Lm− 1;
1
Lt
Lt∑
j=1
[
1−G
(
NBLm−1
Ai,j
)]
, if i=Lm.
(25)
Let Pem,i denote the average message error rate of xi,j , then
Pem,i = 1 − Pcm,i. The average message SER Pem can be
calculated as
Pem =
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pem,i = 1− 1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pcm,i. (26)
We use the assumption that message symbols are selected from
the constellation points set with equal probability. Due to the
uniformity characteristic of the hash functions, different tag
bits can also be considered appearing with equal probability
[19].
We now consider the error performance of the tag signal.
Suitable hash functions exhibit “avalanche effect”, i.e., the
output changes significantly if the input alters slightly [19].
The authentication is extremely likely to fail when the message
estimation has only one bit error, which indicates that the re-
calculated MAC will be meaningless if the message parts have
errors. As a result, we consider the tag SER under the condi-
tion that the message symbol is detected correctly. Note that
the message SER can be controlled to be low enough (e.g. less
than 10−6) in a proper embedding design, where the power of
tag signals is constrained according to the power of message
signals. Therefore, in this paper, the tag correct rate and
error rate are calculated from the perspective of conditional
probability. When the embedded symbol xi,j is transmitted,
the correct detection rate of tag ti,1 and ti,Lt can be calculated
by G(NCi,1/Ai,1) and 1−G(NCi,Lt−1/Ai,Lt), respectively.
When 1 < j < Lt, the correct detection rate of tag ti,j
can be calculated by G(NCi,j/Ai,j) − G(NCi,j−1/Ai,j).
Therefore, the tag correct detection rate under the condition
that the message symbol mi is correctly obtained, Pct,i, can
be determined by (19), which is
Pct,i =
1
Lt
{
G
(
NCi,1
Ai,1
)
+ 1−G
(
NCi,Lt−1
Ai,Lt
)
+
Lt−1∑
j=2
[
G
(
NCi,j
Ai,j
)
−G
(
NCi,j−1
Ai,j
)]}
.
(27)
Therefore, the average tag SER, denoted by Pet, can be
represented by
Pet =
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
(1− Pct,i)
=
1
LmLt
Lm∑
i=1
Lt−1∑
j=1
[
1−G
(
NCi,j
Ai,j
)
+G
(
NCi,j
Ai,j+1
)]
.
(28)
B. Tag Embedding Methods
Two tag embedding methods are considered in this paper.
First, we apply the uniform tag embedding method as tradi-
tional active PLA methods do. However, the error floor shown
in the performance results indicates that the uniform embed-
ding is not suitable for the IIoT system. Therefore, we propose
a new method to realize PLA, which is called message-based
tag embedding. The details of these two embedding methods
are introduced below.
1) Conventional Uniform Tag Embedding: Uniform tag
embedding means the power interval of two adjacent tags em-
bedded into the same message signal is a constant |∆t|2, i.e.,
|ti,j+1|2−|ti,j |2 = |∆t|2 (i = 1, · · · , Lm; j = 1, · · · , Lt−1).
According to the constellation design results of (16), the
optimal power of the first constellation point is zero. Thus,
the power of the first tag symbol embedded into each message
symbol is set to zero, i.e., |ti,1|2 = 0 (i = 1, · · · , Lm). In this
context, the transmitted signal xi,j is represented by
xi,j =
√
|mi|2 + (j − 1)|∆t|2. (29)
Take Lm = Lt = 4 as an example, the constellation pattern
of the uniform embedding method is shown in Fig. 3(a).
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(a) Constellation pattern of uniform tag embedding.
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(b) Constellation pattern of message-based tag embedding.
Fig. 3. The constellation patterns of two tag embedding methods.
Using (25) and Ai,j = |mi|2 + (j − 1)|∆t|2 + σ2, we can
calculate the correct message detection rate Pcm,i. Meanwhile,
the correct tag detection rate Pct,i can be obtained by (27).
When Em and Lm are fixed, the asymptotically optimal
message constellation pattern is given by (16). When we set
a specific Lt, then Pem and Pet are both functions of a single
variable ∆t. We use a simple case (Lm = 4, Lt = 2,
N = 128) to examine the performance of the uniform tag
embedding design. A basic rule for the uniform tag embedding
is that |∆t|2 should not exceed A2,1 −A1,1, otherwise the
power of x1,2 will exceed the power of x2,1 and the tag
embedding will totally ruin the message signal. Let β denote
the normalized tag power, i.e., β = |∆t|
2
A2,1−A1,1 (β ≤ 1). The
relationship between SER and β is shown in Fig. 4. The
message SER increases as the tag power increases. However,
the tag SER only decreases slightly when the tag power
increases. As shown in Fig. 4, the tag SER has an error
floor higher than 10%, which indicates that the uniform tag
embedding is not a suitable method to realize PLA in the non-
coherent massive SIMO-based IIoT system.
To analyze the cause of the error floor, we examine the
SER of tags embedded into different message symbols, i.e.,
Pet,i, (i = 1, · · · , Lm). Under the same case (i.e., Lm =
4, Lt = 2, N = 128), the trend of different tag SER
are shown in Fig. 5 when γm = 10dB. In Fig. 5, as the
7embedded tag power increases, the SER of tags embedded
into different message symbols all decrease. However, the em-
bedded tag has different degrees of impacts on each message
symbol. Specifically, tags embedded in high power message
symbols have much higher error probabilities than in low
power message symbols, i.e., Pet,4 > Pet,3 > Pet,2 > Pet,1.
The reason is that the message constellation points in the
considered system contain the relationship of geometric series
as shown in Fig. 2. The embedded tag power is constrained
by the lowest two power message symbols (m1 and m2), i.e.,
|∆t|2 ≤ A2,1−A1,1. In this context, the tag power is relatively
low and not suitable for a high power message symbol (m3
or m4), because the variance of the received signal power
increases as the power of the transmitted signal increases [27].
The error floor is caused by high tag error rate of Pet,3 and
Pet,4. To support this analysis, we examine the value of Pet,1
and Pet,4 for different values of γm. From the results shown
in Fig. 6, we can observe that the values of Pet,4 are above
0.2 for different γm. Though the value of Pet,1 decreases
sharply as γm increases, the error floor in Fig. 4 cannot be
avoided due to a large value of Pet,4. Therefore, the uniform
tag embedding design cannot achieve a good performance in
the considered system. This finding motivates us to propose
another tag embedding design which is called message-based
tag embedding and elaborated in the subsequent subsection.
Note that although the uniform tag embedding method was
applied in some existing works [22] [23], its application in
non-coherent communication systems has not been studied
prior to the work of this paper. A tag SER error floor of this
method is also a new research finding.
2) Message-based Tag Embedding: Message-based tag
means the power of the tag signal is dependent on the message
which the tag is embedded into, in other words, the power of
ti,j should be designed properly according to the power of
mi. It is reasonable to propose such tag embedding design,
because the impacts of the tag power on different message
symbols are different as shown in Fig. 5. To be specific, the
value of ti,j should become larger as i increases due to the
increasing variance of the received signal power. Lower power
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Fig. 4. The error performance of the uniform tag embedding design.
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Fig. 5. The SER of tags embedded into different message symbols.
tags may be suitable for low power message symbol m1, but
they cannot perform well for large power message symbol
m4. On the other hand, relatively large power tags may have
severe interference to low power message symbols as the de-
cision region is narrow between low power message symbols.
Therefore, message-based tag embedding is necessary in the
considered massive SIMO system.
In tag set T = {ti,j |i = 1, · · · , Lm; j = 1, · · · , Lt}, we
let |ti,1|2 = 0 (i = 1, · · · , Lm) as discussed in Subsection
IV-B1. Then T has Lm · (Lt − 1) non-zero elements, which
indicates there are Lm · (Lt − 1) variables that need to be
considered in the tag embedding design. To reduce the scale
of this design problem, we make an assumption that the power
of embedded signal to the same message mi also consists of
the geometrical sequence as expressed in (16), i.e., Ai,j+1 =
Ai,jri (i = 1, · · · , Lm; j = 1, · · · , Lt − 1). ri is called tag
embedding coefficient. This assumption is reasonable because
the geometrical sequence relationship between constellation
points is asymptotic optimal in the considered non-coherent
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Fig. 6. The SER of tags embedded into the first and the fourth symbol.
8PAM [9]. The value of ri ranges from 1 to R1/(Lt−1), i.e.,
1 < ri < R
1/(Lt−1). This is because the power of a message
signal plus the power of its corresponding tag signal should not
exceed the power of next message signal in the constellation.
In this context, the number of variables reduces from Lm ·
(Lt − 1) to Lm. The tag average SER Pet in (28) can be
further written as
Pet =
Lt − 1
LmLt
Lm∑
i=1
[
1−G
(
Nri ln ri
ri − 1
)
+G
(
N ln ri
ri − 1
)]
=
Lt − 1
LmLt
Lm∑
i=1
{1−G [Nv(ri)] +G [Nu(ri)]} ,
(30)
where v(ri) = ri ln riri−1 and u(ri) =
ln ri
ri−1 . If we take
Lm = Lt = 4 as an example, the constellation pattern of
the message-based embedding method is shown in Fig. 3(b).
The core issue of this embedding design is how to determine
ri (i = 1, · · · , Lm), which will be elaborated in Section V.
V. MESSAGE-BASED TAG EMBEDDING DESIGN
In this section, we elaborate how to design the constellation
pattern of the message-based tag embedding method while
satisfying key system requirements (e.g. communication re-
liability and power constraint). Then we analyze the trade-
off relationship between message SER and tag SER, which
expresses the impacts on authentication to system commu-
nication reliability. The purpose of this section is to design
an optimal embedding scheme to minimize tag SER when
the total average power is constrained. Meanwhile, the system
reliability should meet a certain requirement, i.e., Pem < δ,
where δ is the message SER requirement threshold. This
optimization problem is formulated as follows
min
{Ai,j}j=1,··· ,Lti=1,··· ,Lm
Pet (31a)
s.t. Et + Em ≤ Etot, (31b)
Pem ≤ δ. (31c)
This problem is non-trivial to solve because of multiple
optimization variables and complex structure of the constraint
function. To simplify this problem, we use two steps to solve
it. First, using the assumption (Ai,j+1 = Ai,jri) in Subsection
IV-B2, we find the optimal tag embedding scheme when the
message constellation is fixed (i.e., Em is given). Second, we
search for the optimal allocated power of message Em that
can minimize the tag SER.
We now consider the first step. When Em is fixed, the
message SER Pem and the tag SER Pet are given by (26) and
(30), respectively. Note that Pem is complicated to compute
since it contains multiple variables (Ai,j , i = 1, · · · , Lm, j =
1, · · · , Lt). To reduce the complexity of constraint (31c), an
upper bound of message SER, Puem, can be derived to replace
Pem in (31c). The upper bound can be derived as follows
Puem =
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{1−G [Ng(ri)] +G [Nh(ri)]} , (32)
where g(ri) =
R ln R
ri
Lt−1
R−riLt−1 , h(ri) =
ri
Lt−1 ln R
ri
Lt−1
R−riLt−1 .The proof
is provided in Appendix A.
Using variable substitution ri = eki (0 < ki < lnRLt−1 )
and the message SER upper bound in (32), the optimization
problem (31) can be reformulated as
min
{ki}Lmi=1
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
{
1 +G
[
Nu(eki)
]−G [Nv(eki)]}
(33a)
s.t.
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Ai,1(e
ki − 1) ≤ Etot − Em, (33b)
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{
1−G [Ng(eki)]+G [Nh(eki)]} ≤ δ,
(33c)
0 < ki <
lnR
Lt − 1 . (33d)
We can show that (33) is a convex optimization problem and
the proof is provided in Appendix B. Therefore it can be
efficiently solved by interior-point method and the optimal tag
embedding scheme can be determined when Em is given.
In the second step, we consider the situation when Em is a
variable, different Em results in different values of Pet. In this
case, the optimized result of (33) is a function of Em, which
is denoted by H(Em). Note that when H(Em) achieves its
minimal value, the inequality (31b) will become an equation,
i.e., Em + Et = Etot. The reason is that if Etot still has
a surplus, Pem and Pet can be further reduced by increasing
message and tag power at the same time. Therefore, the second
step of this optimization problem can be described as finding
the optimal power allocation between message signal and tag
signal when the constraints are still satisfied. Define the power
allocation factor α,
α =
Em
Etot
, α0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (34)
where α0 is the minimum factor that makes Em satisfy the
constraint Puem ≤ δ. The function H(Em) can be represented
by H(α), which indicates that different α corresponds to
different minimized tag SER. Therefore, the power allocation
problem can be formulated as
min
α0≤α≤1
H(α) (35a)
s.t. Et = (1− α)Etot, (35b)
Pue,m ≤ δ. (35c)
This is a problem of single variable with a limited range, which
can be efficiently solved by one-dimensional search.
When we set different values of message SER requirement
threshold δ for the considered system, different minimized tag
SER can be obtained by solving the optimization problem
(31). Therefore, we can characterize the trade-off between
the message and tag error performance through changing the
values of the message SER requirement thresholds.
9VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We carried out computer simulations to verify the analysis
and effectiveness of our design. To show the accuracy of the
message and tag error performance analysis of the message-
based tag embedding method, the theoretical and simulation
results of Pem and Pet are demonstrated in Fig. 7. The
simulation parameters of Fig. 7 are set the same as that in
Fig. 4 to compare the proposed PLA method with the uniform
tag embedding, i.e., N = 128, Lm = 4, Lt = 2. We can
see from Fig. 7 that the simulation results match well with
the theoretical counterparts, which verifies the accuracy of the
theoretical analysis. Therefore, we use theoretical results in
the following figures to show other properties. As shown in
Fig. 7, the message SER Pem increases as the tag embedding
coefficient r increases. Meanwhile, the tag SER Pet decreases
sharply, which is a contrast to the tag error performance of the
uniform embedding method in Fig. 4. To be specific, the tag
SER of message-based embedding can decrease continuously
while the tag SER of uniform embedding has an error floor
close to 0.1. Note that Pet is independent of γm as expressed in
(30), and we only show the theoretical and simulation results
of Pet when γm = 10dB. Another key observation from Fig. 7
is that the message SER Pem decreases significantly when γm
increases, because the distance between adjacent constellation
points gets farther and the communication error probability
reduces accordingly.
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Fig. 7. Error rate performance of the message-based tag embedding design.
Notice that the purpose of Fig. 7 is to verify the correctness
of the theoretical analysis, and the optimization problem in
(31) is not considered in the simulation. Now to understand the
entire system performance, we show the solution to the prob-
lem in (31) in Fig. 8. In this simulation, the system parameters
are kept the same as in Fig. 4, i.e., N = 128, Lm = 4, Lt = 2.
Through different γtot and δ parameters, the trade-off between
message and tag error performance is characterized in Fig. 8.
We can observe from the trade-off curves that the tag SER
decreases as the message SER requirement threshold increases.
Both the tag and message SER can be reduced when the
total system average power increases. The trade-off curves
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Fig. 8. The trade-off between the message and tag error performance.
present the optimal tag SER performance under different
system requirements for message SER, which can provide
useful insights for a practical PLA system design. Reasonable
operating points are dependent on the specific requirements of
the IIoT system, which can be determined through the trade-off
curves in Fig. 8. According to the reliability requirement and
the power constraint of the system, we can obtain the expected
authentication accuracy. As such, the system can operate under
this certain transmitter power with the specific reliability and
authentication accuracy.
We then consider the impact of modulation orders and the
number of receiving antennas on system performance. The tag
SER performance under different parameters Lm, Lt and N is
illustrated in Fig. 9. In this simulation, a typical message SER
threshold δ is set to 10−6. As shown in Fig. 9, relatively small
message and tag modulation order (e.g., Lm = 2, Lt = 2)
can achieve a low tag SER even with a moderate number
of receiving antennas (e.g., N = 32). With other parameters
unchanged, the tag SER increases dramatically when Lt
changes from 2 to 4. However, the tag SER can be reduced
significantly by increasing the number of receiving antennas.
Therefore, the system overall performance can be enhanced
further by increasing the number of receiving antennas.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an active PLA mechanism,
message-based tag embedding, for non-coherent massive
SIMO-based IIoT systems. This paper is the first to show
that active PLA can be realized without the need of pilot
signal and channel estimation. We designed the optimal tag
embedding scheme when the message constellation is given.
Then we solved the power allocation problem to obtain the
optimal tag SER performance. The trade-off curves between
tag SER and message SER were depicted to offer a com-
prehensive understanding of the system performance. From
the simulation results, we can conclude that message-based
tag embedding is essential for the considered non-coherent
system. The proposed authentication method can meet the
specific power and error rate requirements of the IIoT system.
10
15 16 17 18 19 20
Total average signal to noise ratio (dB)
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
Ta
g 
sy
m
bo
l e
rro
r r
at
e
Fig. 9. Tag SER performance under different system parameters.
Moreover, increasing number of receiving antennas can boost
system reliability by reducing the impact of fading. The
proposed PLA method might encounter a potential weakness
in practical implementation. When jamming attacks occur, the
receiver may not be able to accurately recover the message
and the MAC. As a future work, we will consider the impacts
of jamming attacks on our PLA scheme, and extend the
application of our scheme to industrial scenarios with severe
interference.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF AN UPPER BOUND OF THE MESSAGE SER
Notice that the average message SER of x1 is less than
for transmitting
√|m1|2 + |t1,Lt|2, because near constellation
points produce a large message SER. Then the upper bound
of Pem,1 can be derived as follows
Pem,1 =
1
Lt
[
P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · ,mLm |x1 =
√
|m1|2 + |t1,1|2
)
+ P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · ,mLm |x1 =
√
|m1|2 + |t1,2|2
)
+ · · ·
+ P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · ,mLm |x1 =
√
|m1|2 + |t1,Lt |2
)]
< P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · ,mLm |x1 =
√
|m1|2 + |t1,Lt |2
)
= P
( ||y||2
N
> B1
)
= 1−G
(
NB1
A1,Lt
)
.
(36)
Similarly, the average message SER of xLm is less than trans-
mitting
√|mLm |2 + |tLm,1|2, so the upper bound of Pem,Lm
can be derived as follows
Pem,Lm < P
(
mˆ=m1, · · · ,mLm−1|xLm=
√
|mLm |2 + |tLm,1|2
)
= P
( ||y||2
N
< BLm−1
)
= G
(
NBLm−1
ALm,1
)
.
(37)
Further, the average message SER of xi(i = 2, · · · , Lm − 1)
also has an upper bound due to the same reason above,
Pem,i < P
(
mˆ = m1, · · · ,mi−1|xi =
√
|mi|2 + |ti,1|2
)
+ P
(
mˆ = mi+1, · · · ,mLm |xi =
√
|mi|2 + |ti,Lt |2
)
= 1−G
(
NBi
Ai,Lt
)
+G
(
NBi−1
Ai,1
)
.
(38)
From the above, an upper bound of Pem can be derived as
Pem =
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pem,i
<
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
[
1−G
(
NBi
Ai,Lt
)
+G
(
NBi
Ai+1,1
)]
=
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{1−G [Ng(ri)] +G [Nh(ri)]} ,
(39)
where g(ri) =
R ln R
ri
Lt−1
R−riLt−1 , h(ri) =
ri
Lt−1 ln R
ri
Lt−1
R−riLt−1 .
Therefore, an upper bound of message SER, Puem, can be
represented by
Puem =
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{1−G [Ng(ri)] +G [Nh(ri)]} . (40)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE CONVEX OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Let F (k) = 1 + G
[
Nu(ek)
] − G [Nv(ek)] and W (k) =
1−G [Ng(ek)]+G [Nh(ek)].
First, we prove that the objective function in (33a) is a
convex function for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . F (k) is a convex
function for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 according to the Lemma 2 in
[9]. The objective function in (33a) is a sum of Lm convex
functions F (ki) (i = 1, · · · , Lm) and its Hessian matrix is a
diagonal matrix, thus the Hessian matrix is positive definite
and the objective function in (33a) is a convex function for
0 < k < lnRLt−1 .
Then, we prove that the left side of (33b) is a convex
function for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . Note that e
k − 1 is a basic
convex function. The left side of (33b) is a sum of Lm
convex functions eki − 1 (i = 1, · · · , Lm) and its Hessian
matrix is a diagonal matrix, so it is also a convex function for
0 < k < lnRLt−1 .
Finally, we prove that the left side of (33c) is a convex
function for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . Let W1(k) = G
[
Ng(ek)
]
and
W2(k) = G
[
Nh(ek)
]
. Then we have W ′(k) = W ′2(k) −
W ′1(k). The derivative of G(z) is fZ(z) =
1
(N−1)!z
N−1e−z .
Then we have
W ′1(k) = fZ
[
Ng(ek)
]
Ng′(ek)
=
1
(N − 1)!
[
Ng(ek)
]N−1
e−Ng(e
k)Ng′(ek).
(41)
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Since h(ek) = g(ek) e
k(Lt−1)
R = g(e
k) +
[k(Lt − 1)− lnR], we can obtain that h′(ek) =
1
Re
k(Lt−1) [g(ek)(Lt − 1) + g′(ek)]. Then we have
W ′2(k) = fZ
[
Nh(ek)
]
Nh′(ek)
=
1
(N − 1)!
[
Nh(ek)
]N−1 · e−Nh(ek)Nh′(ek)
=
1
(N − 1)!
[
Ng(ek)
ek(Lt−1)
R
]N−1
· e−N[g(ek)+k(Lt−1)−lnR]
·N
{
1
R
ek(Lt−1)
[
g(ek)(Lt − 1) + g′(ek)
]}
= W ′1(k) +
1
(N − 1)!N
Ng(ek)Ne−Ng(e
k)(Lt − 1).
(42)
Therefore, we can simplify the W ′(k) as follows
W ′(k) =
1
(N − 1)!N
N (Lt − 1)g(ek)Ne−Ng(ek). (43)
The second-order derivative of W (k) can be obtained by
W ′′(k) =
NN+1(Lt − 1)g(ek)N−1e−Ng(ek)g′(ek)
[
1− g(ek)]
(N − 1)! ,
(44)
where
g′(ek)=
(Lt−1)R
{
ek(Lt−1)−R+ek(Lt−1) [lnR−k(Lt−1)]
}
[R− ek(Lt−1)]2 .
(45)
Let q = ek(Lt−1), then
g′(ek) =
(Lt − 1)Rq
(R− q)2 (1 + ln
R
q
− R
q
). (46)
Since lnx−x is a monotonically decreasing function for x > 1
and Rq > 1, then we have 1 + ln
R
r − Rr < 0. Therefore,
g′(ek) < 0 for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . Then we know that g(e
k) is a
decreasing function when 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . Moreover,
lim
k→ lnRLt−1
g(ek) = lim
q→R
R ln Rq
R− q = 1 (47)
then 1 − g(ek) < 0 for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . We can conclude
that W ′′(k) > 0 (0 < k < lnRLt−1 ), thus W (k) is a convex
function for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 . The left side of (33c) is a sum of
Lm−1 functions W (ki) (i = 1, · · · , Lm−1) and its Hessian
matrix is a diagonal matrix. Therefore, the left side of (33c)
is a convex function for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 .
Above all, the optimization problem (33) is a convex
problem for 0 < k < lnRLt−1 .
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